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Discussion
Thoughts on the Divergence of
Contract and Promise
Ian Bartrum
In her recent work, Seana Shiffrin has explored several normative divergences
between the legal requirements of contract law and the social conventions of
promising.' She laments a "problematic" discrepancy between the two sets of
norms, which she sees thrusting responsible moral agents onto the horns of a
destructive dilemma. Her argument has inspired a prompt wave of response and
reaction, to which this essay is, I suppose, a somewhat belated addition.' In what
follows, I suggest that the fundamental flaw in Shiffrin's approach is her failure
to provide separate accounts of the different consequentalist and deontological
justifications that underlie the institutions of promise and contract, both of which
provide us with "moral" reasons for acting. Instead, she seems to treat promises
as giving rise to undifferentiated "moral" reasons, which she then contrasts with
the "legal" reasons a contract creates. While there are certainly good deontological
and consequentalist reasons both to honor our promises and to perform on our
contracts, I argue here that our conception of promissory duty sounds primarily
in deontology, while our ideas about contract rely most heavily on consequentalism. Once this muddy water is cleared, it becomes apparent that contracts and
promises very often serve different functions in our lives, and that contract law-as
an institution of state coercion-primarily addresses the harms a breach causes,
and leaves any interpersonal wrongs occasioned by a broken promise for the relevant moral agents themselves to resolve. Seen in this way, the divergence between
promise and contract may actually facilitate, rather than inhibit, the exercise of
authentic moral agency: it gives the virtuous actor greater space to fulfill her residual obligations for purely personal reasons.
A major shortcoming of Shiffrin's approach is that it fails to provide a substantive
account-either consequentalist or deontological-of how promises give rise to
Thanks to Jules Coleman, David Owens, Chris Essert, the Drake Law School Faculty Workshop, and
the Creighton Law School Faculty Workshop for comments on earlier drafts; and to my invaluable
research assistant, Ross Laird, for his hard work and insight.
1. See Seana Shiffrin, "The Divergence of Contract and Promise," (2007) 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708.
2. See Barbara H. Fried, "What's Morality Got to Do With It?" (2007) 120 Harv. L. Rev. Forum
53; Charles Fried, "The Convergence of Contract and Promise" (2007) 120 Harv. L. Rev. Forum
I at 1; Jody S. Kraus, "The Correspondence of Contract and Promise" (2009) 109 Colum. L.
Rev. 1603; Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, "Objectivity and Subjectivity in Contract Law: A Copernican
Response to Professor Shiffrin" (2008) 21 Can. J.L. & Jur. 399; Liam Murphy, "Contract and
Promise" (2006) 120 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 10 (2007); Michael G. Pratt, "Contract: Not Promise"
(2008) 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 801 at 802; Steven W. Feldman, "Autonomy and Accountability
in the Law of Contracts" (2009) 58 Drake L. Rev. 177. Indeed, Suffolk Law School plans to hold
a symposium this spring celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of Charles Fried's book Contract
as Promise, much of will likely focus on Shiffrin's recent work.
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"moral" reasons, although her argument seems to assume that promises impose
"duties," presumably with deontological underpinnings. To fill this gap for the purposes of this paper I rely on David Owens's "authority-interest" account of promising, which offers a persuasive explanation of the transfer of a "moral power"
(authority over one's future actions) that promising entails. As Owens has it, when
we make a promise we voluntarily renounce our right to make decisions for certain
kinds of reasons in the future-we willingly bestow that bit of our autonomy upon
another-and this gives our promisee the authority to obligate us. We may choose
to enter into promises for any number of purposes, some of which may be particularly personal or profound, and which may thus seem inappropriate contexts for
a contract. Think, for example, of a promise of fidelity to a lover, or of a promise
made to a friend-or even a stranger-as she lies dying. The strength or vitality
of these kinds of promises seems rooted in some sense of obligation, some deontological emotion, that might arise out a particular relationship or context; and in
such a situation a contract may seem unnecessary or perhaps even immoral. That
is, these may be the kinds of promises we do not think it appropriate for the state
to enforce.
On the contrary, there are circumstances-perhaps those when significant financial interests are at stake, or in normal business relationships between strangerswhen a contract seems perfectly appropriate as state-enforced insurance against
the possible harms a broken agreement might bring about. In such circumstances,
we may not feel-or may not want to rely upon-the personal or contextual deontology of promising because, in truth, we are concerned only about the impersonal
(and largely fungible) harms the broken contract may cause. Here it is
acceptable-even desirable-for the state to remedy these harms in impersonal
and fungible kinds of ways. We depend upon the assurances of contract law in such
circumstances to help provide stability and reliability in our economic and commercial endeavors, but we do not rely on the law to enforce our deontological obligations. At least in certain paradigmatic cases, then, it is easy enough to see the
normative differences between the consequentalist reasons underlying contracts
and the deontological reasons underlying promises.
There are, of course, many circumstances in the middle; those where we may
have both deontological and consequentalist reasons for fulfilling either a promise
or a contract, and where both kinds of remedies for breach-moral reprobation and
legal damages-may be appropriate. But in remembering the paradigm cases of
both institutions, I think, it is easier to keep track of which institution is (at least
primarily) imposing which kinds of norms, and in so doing it may be easier to
understand and account for the divergences in the appropriate kinds of remedy. That
is what I hope to do below, and my account begins with a brief summary of
Shiffrin's divergence argument and the worries she has for the wider culture of
moral agency. I then begin my critique by summarizing David Owens's account
of promising. Finally, I look to John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant to help provide
my own explanation of the different roles that promises and contracts fill in the
life of a virtuous moral agent. Indeed, I suggest that there may be good reasons
why the liberal state should ground "legal" requirements-those backed by the
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threat of state coercion-in consequentalist reasoning, but can, and should, leave
the fulfillment of deontological duties to the discretion of individual actors.
Seana Shiffrin: The Divergence of Promise and Contract
Shiffrin is concerned about the corrosive effects that too much divergence between
"moral" and "legal" norms can have, both on individual moral agents and on the
broader moral culture. Because she accepts a weak version of the separation thesis
("there is no direct and reliable route from the content of interpersonal morality
to the appropriate content of the corresponding area of law"),' she must explicitly
define the particular kinds of divergence that are problematic in this regard. She
chooses to explore the divergence between the "moral" norms of promising and
the "legal" norms of contract as an exemplar of a potentially larger problem. She
begins by identifying several divergences between the two institutions, and then
identifies the problematic ways that these divergences operate to frustrate individual
moral agents. She then goes on to suggest that "the culture created by contract law
and its justifications make it more difficult to nurture and sustain moral agency
[generally]."4
Shiffrin's argument begins with two problematic assumptions, to which I will
devote more attention in the next section. First, she seems unflinchingly to accept
the Restatement's definition of a contract as "a promise"; although she does at times
seem to recognize contracts as a special species of promise-or as legal arrangements that merely rely on an underlying promise. Second, she simply assumes, without theoretical justification or explanation, that promises operate to impose "moral"
duties or obligations on their makers. Building on these assumptions, Shiffrin identifies a number of specific divergences between promising and contracting.
First, she points out that contract law generally does not enforce specific performance as a remedy for breach. Rather, the default remedy is expectation damages, wherein the promisor must pay to place the promisee in the position she would
have occupied had the contract been performed. Thus, absent special circumstances,
the law requires financial, but not actual, performance-even when actual performance may still be possible. This, Shiffrin argues, is at odds with the norms of
promising, which require a promisor to perform when possible, rather than simply
pay off the promisee. Further, Shiffrin objects to the Hadley v. Baxendale rule,
which limits damages to those consequences of breach that were reasonably foreseeable to the promisor at the time the contract was made. Again, she contends that
promissory norms hold one who breaks a promise responsible for all the resulting
damages-or, at the very least, for those damages that were foreseeable at the time
the promise was broken, not made.
Second, Shiffrin explores the mitigation doctrine, which requires a promisee
to do what she reasonably can to alleviate the damages a breach may cause. If the
promisee fails to mitigate, the law will not compensate her for the damages she
3. Shiffrin, supra note I at 713-14.
4.Ibid. at 712-13.
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might have avoided through self-help. Again, Shiffrin contends that the law does
not reflect promissory norms here, which do not require a frustrated promisee to
take such action. While we would certainly encourage promisees not to allow damages to mount unheeded, a promise imposes no affirmative duty to mitigate, as does
the law. Shiffrin wonders briefly whether a promisee would have a moral duty to
honor a mitigation request from the promisor, but concludes that such a question
would depend on a number of interpersonal factors "to which the law is
insensitive."' Thus, promise and contract diverge regarding the mitigation doctrine.
Finally, Shiffrin turns to punitive or liquidated damage clauses, which contract
law generally refuses to enforce. Though she concedes that this is not as definitive
a case of divergence as the first two, she suggests that our social normative practices
do permit us to indicate how seriously we take our promises by stipulating the consequences of a failure to perform. She then argues that we can regard "the ability
to specify punitive damages as a very rough legal counterpart to the poorly defined
mechanisms through which parties mark a particular promissory relation as especially serious or not."' So, by failing to honor liquidated or punitive damage clauses,
contract law again diverges from the normative institution of promising.
Shiffrin then sets about demonstrating that these divergences are problematic and
not beneficial or benign. She begins by discounting the common justifications for
contract law's reliance on expectation damages. The most problematic of these justifications-and the only one I will mention here-is the doctrine of "efficient
breach" which suggests that a promisor may (or should, in the strong version) break
a contract when the total costs of performing would exceed the costs of paying expectation damages. Indeed, all-things-considered such a breach actually benefits society
(so the theory goes), and the law should not impose any kind of punitive damages
that would discourage it. This is a straightforward consequentalist justification; yet,
perhaps incongruously, Shiffiin's objection is that the doctrine seems to give people
legal permission to forego the deontological duties that their promises entail. In the
end, she worries that this asks people to choose between what "morality" requires
and what the law does-which is exactly the problem she identifies with divergence
in the first place. Thus, she rejects the efficient breach doctrine as a satisfactory
justification of expectation damages at least partly because she blurs together consequentalist and deontological kinds of reasons for acting. That is-as in other
notable instances-consequentalist and deontological moral views may point us in
different directions; but this should hardly come as a surprise.
After rejecting several other legalistic justifications, Shiffrin makes the affirmative argument that the corrosive influence that the divergence between "moral"
and "legal" norms has on the culture of moral agency. Here she makes her larger
case-though never, it seems, explicitly-that real dangers lurk when consequentalism begins to infect our deontological reasoning. She begins with two anecdotal
examples. First, she describes a woman who is ridiculed as a "moral fetishist" for
feeling bound to honor her lease despite significant personal inconvenience. Or,
5.Ibid. at 725.
6. Ibid. at 727.
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she recounts the story of friend who is chided for feeling angry with a contractor
who fails to appear in spite of repeated promises: "It isn't a big deal. It's business."'
Shiffrin sees these examples as illustrative of a general decay in the normative culture that nourishes and maintains responsible moral agency, and she argues that
it is, in part, the problematic divergence of "moral" and "legal" norms that brings
this decay about. While the law does not ask an individual to directly contradict
or reject her deontological duties, it does produce incentives that reinforce (and
possibly reward) behavior that fails to honor the obligations that a promise creates.
She argues that this problematic legal culture asks us to catalog and divide our moral
and social intuitions and estranges us from our better selves. In the end, she concludes that, "A system that leans heavily on such alienation and compartmentalization is dispiriting to defend, to put it mildly."'
David Owens: A Simple Theory of Promising
As I suggested above, Shiffrin builds her argument on two problematic assumptions.
The first is that, for relevant purposes, a contract is roughly equivalent to a promise,
which is an assertion I ultimately reject, though I certainly believe a promise may
accompany a contract. Before I can give much further explanation, however, I must
overcome the second important shortcoming of Shiffrin's account: I need a working
account of what a promise is and how it brings about a change in deontological
obligations. As Shiffrin offers no such theory, I turn to David Owens, whose work
provides an excellent non-instrumental account of the normative significance of
promising. With Owens's account as a theoretical foundation, I can begin to disentangle promises from contracts and better differentiate the purposes each institution serves.
Owens's "A Simple Theory of Promising" aims to explain why the institution
of promising exists, and concludes that it has arisen as a tool that "serves our
authority-interests."'By this Owens means that promising allows us to transfer a
little bit of authority over our actions to another person. For example, if I promise
you that I will pick you up at the train station at seven o'clock, you now have the
authority to require my presence there at that time-and you alone have the authority to release me from my obligation. Owens theorizes that we are willing to cede
bits of our authority in this way, in part, because doing so allows us to participate
in a useful practice of "give-and-take." That is, we can trade instances of authority
over each other in mutually beneficial ways. But in the end, it is the transfer of the
authority-interest itself-and not some instrumental benefit-that justifies and
explains the institution of promising.
The train station is a fairly trivial example, however, and so perhaps does not
capture the personal and important interests a promise can serve as effectively as
a more complex illustration might. Think of a graduate student preparing to enter
7. Ibid. at 741.
8. Ibid. at 749.

9. David Owens, "A Simple Theory of Promising" (2006) 115 Phil. Rev. 51 at 69.
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the academic job market who goes to his famous and well-regarded mentor and
elicits the promise of a sterling professional recommendation. Upon Owens's
account, the elder professor has given-willingly, perhaps even gladly-the student
authority to demand from her a glowing reference at some future date. That the
professor is willing to do this certainly serves the student's instrumental interests;
among other things it allows him to devise more precise job-hunting strategies and
to hold himself out to the market in a particular light. But, perhaps even more importantly, the promise also speaks to the student's relationship with his mentor, and
to the professor's confidence and regard for her student. Thus, the act has meaning
and value to both parties regardless of whether it can or will produce any beneficial
consequences-it is in some sense a symbolic sacrifice appropriate to the particular
relationship and context from which it arises.
It is, I think, with these kinds of considerations in mind that Owens posits his
authority-interest account as a better explanation of promising than so-called "information-interest theories," such as David Hume's or Thomas Scanlon's. Such consequentalist accounts explain promising as a practice that allows us to get reliable
information about another's future actions. Owens does not deny that promises can
serve this purpose, but he suggests that other practices-such as predicting our
behavior or stating our future intentions-can serve this information-interest nearly
as effectively as promising. Again, it may be useful to think of the student and his
professor. A simple testimonial from the mentor saying that she plans to write a
great letter and make several calls on his behalf might serve the student's information interests quite well; but it does not have the same interpersonal meaning
or value as would the promise. We need something more to explain this very real
difference between testimonials and promises, and thus Owens contends that
promising initially arose to serve another purpose: our desire to transfer-or perhaps
again "sacrifice" is a more apt word here-authority-interests to particular people
in particular circumstances.
Indeed, Owens explicitly argues that "a promise [is] a moralpower granted to
the promisee,"" and I think that the authority-interest theory has the resources to
justify this claim. Owens comes closest to explaining the deontological significance
of promising when he says "this authority-interest is not an interest in self-control
... [r]ather it is an interest in having a certain moral power, the moral freedom to
act in accordance with one's own judgment about what one ought to do rather than
in accordance with someone else's.""' Here Owens' thoughts recall Joseph Raz's
explanation of the nature of authority in his "exclusive" account of legal positivism.12
Raz contends that to submit to an authority is to surrender one's right to balance
for oneself the "dependent" reasons for and against taking a particular action. We
10. Ibid. at 73. As I have said throughout this essay, consequentalists claim that efficiency and consequences give rise to "moral" obligations that are just as important as-indeed more important
than-deontological duties. Thus, I realize that some confusion may arise from Owens' use of
the word "moral" as indicative of deontological reasoning. I believe, though, that this is the sense
in which Owens intends the word here, and, likewise, the sense in which Mill and Kant intend
it in the discussion below.
11. Ibid. at 70.
12. Joseph Raz, "Practical Reason and Norms" (London, UK: Hutchison Press 1975).
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might contrast this with consulting an advisor, who can give us his thoughts on
some matter, but whose advice we are under no obligation to follow. On the contrary, when we submit to an authority we are substituting another's judgmentsincluding her moral judgments-for our own. This seems to be the kind of transfer
of "moral power" that Owens envisions; and it helps to explain the significant
change in normative circumstances that a promise can bring about.
According to Owens, then, a promisor transfers a "moral power"-an authorityinterest-to the promisee when he makes a promise. The promisee, likewise, now
wields a small piece of "moral power" over the promisor: he has authority over
the promisor's actions at some point in the future. Note, however, that this is a socionormative, not a legal, power, and that it relies for its effect upon the promisor's
response to the moral duty he has undertaken. In the event of breach, then, the
promisee's appropriate response is indignation, not a lawsuit; and the promisor has
a personal, but not a legal, duty to make up for his wrong. If this is not enough for
the promisee-if he wants some legally enforceable insurance against the potential
consequences of a breach-he can ask the promisor to submit to the threat of state
coercion by entering into a contract. It is then the contract, not the promise, which
entitles the promisee to damages in the event of breach.
Thus a contract is not a promise in the univocal sense that Shiffrin suggests."
In fact, in some circumstances a contract may be compelling evidence that a
promise alone is not enough. People generally enter into contracts-thus bringing
state power to bear-only when they have some reason to wonder whether the other
party will respond adequately to the socio-normative duties that the promise creates.
Perhaps the particular relationship or context in question does not give rise to sufficiently vital kinds of deontological reasons to inspire faith in performance, and
so it may seem wise and appropriate to seek the comfort of a state-enforced remedy
for breach. It is this difference in the purposes that contracts and promises serve,
I contend, that ultimately justifies the divergence in norms that Shiffrin finds problematic.
A Theory of Divergence: The Harm Principle and Authentic Moral Agency
My own account of the divergence between promise and contract is founded on
the belief that the paradigmatic cases of each institution embody and reflect different kinds of justifications or reasons: contracts serve consequentalist concerns,
while promises create deontological duties. It is perhaps no surprise, therefore,
that my description of contract law begins with the thoughts of one of our most
noted utilitarians-John Stuart Mill's so-called "harm principle." Mill famously
argued that the only just exercise of the state's coercive power "is to prevent harm
to others." 4 The liberal state should not intervene to enforce interpersonal norms
or prevent moral wrongs, nor should it attempt to save individuals from the spiritual
13. It may be that a contract is a promise to be liable for the foreseeable damages of breach; but it
is not a promise to perform in the "authority-interest" sense that Owens describes.
14. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859).
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consequences of their moral failings." What is problematic is harm to others. As
inexactly as this principle translates into our modern law, I suggest that there is
something substantial left of Mill in the legal institution of contract.
As I have argued above, when two parties enter into a contract they are self-consciously stepping outside the world of purely social norms and appealing to the
state's coercive power. The state, in turn, agrees to enforce the terms of the contract,
but-in keeping with Mill's principle-only insofar as a breach of contract results
in actual harm to the parties. The state is not concerned with any wrongs to which
the broken promise may give rise; it is not sensitive to hurt feelings or moral indignations, only with actual harm. Thus the parties are left to resolve or account for
any residual interpersonal wrongs between themselves. It is instructive, I think,
to apply this "harm theory" of contract remedy to the examples of divergence
Shiffrin finds problematic.
First, let us consider the divergence between specific performance and expectation damages. Recall that Shiffrin believes that to rightly reflect promissory norms
the appropriate remedy for breach of contract is, whenever possible, specific performance. When we understand, however, that contract and promise actually serve
different purposes-that the former exists to address harms, not wrongs-this divergence in remedy makes perfect sense. The parties have appealed to the state only
to protect them from the harms they may incur as a result of breach, they have not
asked the state to enforce the norms of promising. Thus the payment of expectation
damages is entirely adequate if it compensates them for the harm suffered.
This account even makes sense of the special circumstances in which the state
will enforce specific performance. These circumstances include the promised sale
of unique goods, or similarly, when the buyer cannot find adequate "cover" (replacement goods). In these two circumstances, it is evident that a monetary payment
cannot adequately compensate for the harm the non-breaching party has suffered.
Put in my terms, in the case of unique goods it is a harm, not merely a wrong, to
be denied sale of the one of a kind item. Likewise when a buyer cannot find replacement goods, the contracted-for goods have now become unique. In both of these
situations, expectation damages fail to remedy the actual harm that the breach has
caused, and thus-given the harm theory of contract-it is appropriate to order
specific performance.
Shiffrin is also concerned about the rule limiting damages to those that were
foreseeable at the time of contract formation. Again, the harm theory makes perfect
sense of this doctrine. When the parties turn to the state by forming a contract, they
are asking for protection against the harms that may arise in the event of breach.
Each party subjects herself to the coercive power of the state regarding the harms
she might reasonably anticipate the other party to suffer in the event of breach. As
these are the terms upon which the state's "insurance policy" is invoked, it makes
sense that these are the terms the state will enforce upon breach. Again, the state
is not concerned with whatever deontological obligations or duties the promisor
may have for the unforeseeable consequences of a broken promise.
15. Ibid. On the use of the term "moral" here, see supra note 10.
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Second, Shiffrin is concerned about the mitigation doctrine, which requires the
non-breaching party to do what he can to alleviate the harms that a breach has
caused. Again, the harm theory can explain this divergence from the norms of
promising. If parties enter into a contract as protection only against the harms of
breach, it makes sense that the state will only enforce compensation for those harms
that were not reasonably avoidable. When the non-breaching party refuses to take
reasonable steps to stop the bleeding (so to speak), the harms that occur thereafter
are no longer attributable to the breach: they are, in a sense, self-inflicted. While
a promisee may have no obligation to lessen the wrong a promisor has committed,
a non-breaching party can-and must-do what is reasonable to prevent bringing
more harm into the world.
Finally, Shiffrin points to the divergence brought about by the law's refusal to
enforce punitive or liquidated damages clauses. These clauses attempt to stipulate
an excessive amount of damages up front, presumably with the intent of compelling performance. This divergence, then, is really just a subset of the specific
performance problem. The function of a contract-unlike a promise-is not to
get the other party to perform; it is to provide state-enforced insurance against
the foreseeable harms that breach may occasion. Thus the state will require payment of damages sufficient to compensate for the actual harm of a breach, but
will not get involved in contractual efforts to compel actual performance. Again,
any wrongs that this practice leaves unremedied are the parties', not the state's,
responsibility.
Thus the harm theory of contract can at least explain the divergences between
promise and contract, but I have not yet offered any justification for this state of
affairs. That is, it may be that the different underlying justifications for promises
and contracts can explain the divergence in norms, but this circumstance may still
perpetuate the destruction or decay of a the culture of moral agency that Shiffrin
decries. What is it, then, that justifies the harm theory of contract in terms of encouraging virtuous moral agency? Given my assertion that promises give rise to deontological duties, it might again be unsurprising that in exploring the conditions that
may strengthen or weaken that institution, I turn to the great theorist of obligation
and moral agency: Immanuel Kant.
In The Metaphysics ofMorals, Kant discusses the relationship between morality
and law.' 6 Both, he contends, impose mandatory duties upon us, and both originate
from an external source (unlike self-imposed rules). The overlap between moral
and legal duties is, of course, imperfect-though we could well imagine all moral
duties being reissued as positive law. The essential (at least for my purposes) distinction between a legal duty and a moral duty is a matter of intent. The law obligates us to conform to its norms, but we can do this for any number of reasonsfear, love, profit-without breaking the law. We can only fulfill a moral duty, however, when we do so specifically because it is a duty. As an example, Kant claims
16. For purposes of the following discussion, see generally Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of
Morals, trans. and ed. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 50124. On use of the term "moral", see supra note 10.
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that the suicidal person who refuses to kill himself only deserves moral credit if
the refusal is based on duty, not on fear or some other motive.II While Kant contends
that we do have a moral duty to obey the law, he also contends that there are moral
duties that both precede and survive politics and positive law. And, again, we only
deserve moral approbation--either from ourselves or from others-when we fulfill
these moral duties because they are duties. Put another way, a virtuous act is only
virtuous if it is done for its own sake.

We can usefully apply Kant's ideas to understand how the divergence between
promise and contract actually facilitates and encourages a culture of moral agency
rooted in the concept of moral duty. Succinctly put, by leaving us free to fulfill or
reject the moral obligations we incur in making a promise, the law gives us the
opportunity to engage in authentic moral agency: that is, we are left to fulfill our
moral duties simply because they are duties. This, I contend, allows us to engage
in genuine moral flourishing-virtue for virtue's sake.
Again, if we consider the particular divergences between promise and contract
that Shiffrin identifies, I think they are justified by this account of authentic moral
duty and agency. Regarding specific performance versus expectation damages, let
us take Shiffrin's example of the woman who was ridiculed for wanting to fulfill
the obligations of her lease despite personal inconvenience. It is true, for the reasons
discussed above, that the terms of the contract allow her to break the lease if she
is willing to pay expectation damages. Under the terms of her promise, however,
she is obligated to perform: that is, to stay in the apartment for the full term." The
law does not impede her from fulfilling this deontological duty; it simply leaves
her to do so of her own accord. If she chooses to stay, it is more likely that her decision will be based on a sense of duty, as the law no longer imposes other kinds of
reasons upon her.
Likewise, in the case of the mitigation rule, the promisor is left to his own devices
in deciding how to right the wrongs his failure has caused the promisee. The law
requires the promisee to prevent more harm from accruing in the world, but the
promisor is still duty bound to make up for all the wrongs his breach has brought
about-including the inconvenience of mitigation-but, again, he must do so for
purely deontological reasons. Seen this way, the law actually gives more to the moral
agent; it leaves open a wider space for authentic moral behavior, which has its own
very profound rewards. Conversely, a complete convergence of moral and legal
norms would stunt authentic moral agency with the trappings of legal paternalism.
Thus, I contend that the divergent functions of promise and contract actually facilitate, rather than corrode, a culture of authentic moral agency.

17. Immanuel Kant, The Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by James Ellington

(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1993) at 10.
18. I have suggested above, I think, that the vitality or strength of the woman's deontological duty
to perform may depend upon the particular relationship and/or context involved. While I believe
this is true, I am not prepared at this time to give an account of exactly how these factors are
deontologically significant.
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Conclusion
Seana Shiffrin identifies what she believes are problematic divergences between
the "moral" norms of promising and the "legal" norms of contract. She contends
that these divergences are destructive of the broader culture of moral agency because
they ask individuals to choose between their moral and legal duties. I agree that
promise and contract diverge, but argue that this divergence reflects the fundamentally different purposes that contracts and promises serve in our lives. In short,
Shiffrin fails adequately to differentiate between consequentalist and deontological
justifications, and the role these reasons play in shaping the norms of contract and
promise. While both kinds ofjustification may give rise to "moral" reasons, those
reasons are not one and the same, as Shiffrin seems at times to suggest. Utility,
that is, may require one remedy, while deontology requires quite another. For
roughly Millsian kinds of reasons, the liberal state is rightly concerned only with
the harms of a breached contract, not the wrongs occasioned by a broken promise.
Indeed, by leaving us to fulfill our moral duties for their own sake, I contend that
these divergences actually facilitate-rather than corrode-a culture of authentic
moral agency.
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